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DANGEROUS OR BENIGN LEGAL 
FICTIONS, COGNITIVE BIASES, AND 
CONSENT IN CONTRACT LAW 
CHUNLIN LEONHARD† 
INTRODUCTION 
Some scholars hate legal fictions with a passion.  Jeremy 
Bentham, a vocal critic of legal fictions, denounced fictions as “a 
syphilis,”1 an “opiate,” a “subterfuge for legislation” and a “wilful 
falsehood.”2  Even supporters of legal fictions endorse their use 
cautiously, with warnings of “danger[]” or “grave risks.”3  
Professor John C. Gray described fictions as handy, but 
“dangerous tools.”4  Unsurprisingly, the word “fiction” is often 
used in a pejorative manner.5  Professor Lon Fuller described 
 
† Chunlin Leonhard is a Professor at Loyola University New Orleans College of 
Law. I would like to thank my husband, Dr. Christoph Leonhard, a licensed clinical 
psychologist and Professor at Chicago School of Professional Psychology at Xavier 
University in New Orleans, for his help with the psychological insights relied upon 
in this Article. I am also grateful to my research assistant Sarah Puder for her 
diligent and timely assistance with this Article. 
1 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 2 (Stanford Univ. Press 1967). 
2 Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (1990). 
3 FULLER, supra note 1, at 9; Harmon, supra note 2, at 15, 61 (pointing out that 
a “legal fiction may be benign in one context, and dangerous or brutal in another”); 
Alina Ng Boyte, The Conceits of Our Legal Imagination: Legal Fictions and the 
Concept of Deemed Authorship, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707, 709 (2014) 
(expressing concerns about use of legal fictions without a clear understanding of 
their purpose when “fundamental questions about human ontology . . . remain 
shrouded by a cloak of falsity” and urging vigilance in using legal fictions); Note, 
Lessons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the Law, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2249 (2002) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. 
4 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 37 (Roland 
Gray ed., Columbia Univ. Press 2d ed. 1921). 
5 FULLER, supra note 1, at 3; Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers and Fiction: 
The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 
53–54 (1989) (immigration law fictions); Note, What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1750 
(2001) (discussing corporate personality). See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 821 (1975) (“An unwanted counsel ‘represents’ the defendant only through a 
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legal fictions as “a disease or affection of language” or a 
“pathology of the law.”6  Nonetheless,7 legal fictions exist in every 
corner of the law in the United States.8  Judges routinely rely on 
them to resolve disputes.9  Legislators rely on them to draft laws 
and statutes.10 
Despite the strong concerns and prevalence of legal fictions 
in our courts,11 no one has elaborated on exactly how we can 
recognize a “dangerous” legal fiction.  If a legal fiction is 
dangerous, should we not try to find out how to identify one?  
Professor Fuller began the process in the early 1930s by 
recognizing fiction as a linguistic phenomenon and a tool for 
understanding our reality.12  He pointed out that if a fiction is 
taken “seriously,” it becomes “dangerous.”13  He cautioned 
against “unjustified transference of assumptions, which may be 
useful and productive in one field, to another field” with possibly 
“highly dangerous” or “disastrous” consequences.14  He suggested, 
without any elaboration, that there would be sufficient 
safeguards against harm if there was an awareness of the 
fiction’s falsity and that the more users were aware of the falsity,  
 
 
tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.”); Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560, 572 
(1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (characterizing as a “mere legal fiction” the 
majority’s finding that the petitioner’s voyage on an allied merchant marine ship 
had terminated his U.S. residency). 
6 FULLER, supra note 1, at viii, 11. 
7 This Article does not intend to engage in a debate about the use of legal 
fictions or over their proper definition. For a summary of the debates concerning the 
legal fictions, see generally Harmon, supra note 2; see also Harvard Note, supra note 
3, at 2229–49 (summarizing historical discussions and the type of legal fictions); 
Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 876 (1986). 
8 FULLER, supra note 1, at 1–2; Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic 
Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (noting that legal fictions are often used 
by judges in common law, but also in statutes); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 
95 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2007) (attempting to classify legal fictions into classic legal 
fictions and new legal fictions). 
9 FULLER, supra note 1, at 1–2; Knauer, supra note 8, at 17. 
10 Knauer, supra note 8, at 17. 
11 FULLER, supra note 1, at 21 (commenting that it is impossible “and 
inadvisable if it were possible” to reject fictions completely); see also id. at 94 
(commenting that “[t]he age of the legal fiction is not over”). 
12 Id. at 11, 93, 106, 114–15. 
13 Id. at 9–10. 
14 Id. at 107. 
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the less dangerous the fiction would be.15  He concluded that a 
fiction became completely safe if users were fully aware of its 
falsity.16 
Professor Fuller stopped short of offering a systematic 
approach to identifying when a fiction can be “dangerous.”17  His 
observations raise more questions.  Why are legal fictions 
dangerous?  Why does awareness of falsity render a legal fiction 
safe?  If awareness of falsity renders a fiction safe, how do people 
become aware of the falsity? How do we otherwise identify 
dangerous legal fictions? 
Since Professor Fuller’s time, legal academia has paid scant 
attention to legal fictions.18  However, there has been growing 
curiosity in how humans, including judges, think and make 
decisions.19  The last four decades saw a group of psychologists 
and behavioral economic experts engaging in numerous scientific 
studies on understanding how humans think and make 
decisions.20  These studies have shown that humans most 
frequently think intuitively and that although intuition may be 
correct at times, intuitive thinking also consistently leads to 
decisional mistakes.21 
Building on existing scholarship on legal fictions and 
empirical psychological research about human decision making 
processes, this Article offers a systematic approach to 
distinguishing a dangerous legal fiction from a benign one.22 
This Article begins by summarizing scholarly discussions 
about legal fictions in general, courts’ typical uses of legal fiction, 
and more general concerns with legal fictions.  Part II of the 
Article summarizes scientific findings about how humans think 
 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id. 
17 Harmon, supra note 2, at 15–16. In one passage in his book, Professor Fuller 
seemed to suggest that one could identify the “dangers of concepts” by examining 
“(1) their centripetal force; (2) their capacity for inducing reification; and (3) their 
metaphorical contamination.” FULLER, supra note 1, at 123. It is not clear whether 
Professor Fuller was talking about legal fictions in particular. He also did not 
elaborate on how one can identify those dangerous characteristics. Id. 
18 Harmon, supra note 2, at 1 (lamenting the little interest in legal fictions on 
the jurisprudential agenda). 
19 FULLER, supra note 1, at 1–2; Knauer, supra note 8, at 17. 
20 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011). 
21 Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on human 
judgment and decision making in 2002. Id. at 10. 
22 Fictions have been used by legislators when drafting laws. However, this 
Article focuses only on use of legal fictions by the courts. 
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and what our common cognitive biases are.  It then explains how 
findings regarding the human decision-making process may shed 
light on why certain legal fictions can be dangerous.  This Section 
also discusses how we can overcome cognitive biases and answers 
the question why awareness of the fictitious nature of a doctrine 
may make it “safe.”  Studies have shown that judges may be 
reminded of their own decision making process and be able to 
engage in more critical analyses to ameliorate the concerns 
regarding legal fictions.23 
Part III offers a systematic approach to distinguishing 
benign from dangerous legal fictions based on a review of 
selected legal fictions.24  This Article suggests that a benign 
fiction comes with some built-in reminders of its fictional nature 
while a dangerous fiction does not.  A fiction may be benign or 
dangerous depending on the presence of any or all of the 
following characteristics:  Whether or not the fiction (1) is labeled 
explicitly as a fiction; (2) rests on complete factual falsity instead 
of reduction of evidentiary proof; or (3) allows the court to reach a 
result consistent with well-established legal or other social 
values.  The presence of one or more of these factors creates 
awareness that the doctrine is a fiction and thus safeguards 
against uncritical excessive use.25  Without those reminders, legal 
fiction can become “dangerous.”  Lack of built-in reminders 
makes it more likely judges may use legal fictions for purposes 
not intended by the fictitious doctrine.26 
Finally, Part IV uses the consent doctrine in contract law as 
an example of a dangerous fiction.  This Section briefly traces the 
evolution of the consent doctrine from the early twentieth 
century and shows how consent in many situations has evolved 
 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 143–149. 
24 This Article does not intend to classify or categorize the legal fictions being 
relied upon by courts these days, an impossible task. Life has a tendency of 
presenting myriad problems implicating unanticipated factual situations which 
require a legal solution. As our society develops and things change, legal fictions 
come and go. Some legal fictions are no longer applicable and new legal fictions 
appear continuously. FULLER, supra note 1, at 14. Any attempt to capture all legal 
fictions is difficult because there is no agreed upon definition and is complicated by 
the fact that some writers have used the word “fiction” broadly to describe certain 
ideas, for example legal institutions and presumptions. Id. at 38, 40. 
25 Id. at 107; Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
777, 821–22 (2001) [hereinafter Inside the Judicial Mind]. 
26 FULLER, supra note 1, at 107; Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 
821–22. 
MPP_LEONHARD 12/6/2017  9:00 PM 
2017] DANGEROUS OR BENIGN LEGAL FICTIONS 389 
into a legal fiction due to technological advances, in particular e-
commerce.  Part V offers an example of how the consent fiction, 
when uncritically adopted, poses a “danger” to our society and 
has become a tool to deprive many people of their day in court 
because of courts’ willingness to enforce arbitration “agreements” 
based on the fiction. 
I. LEGAL FICTIONS AND JUDICIAL RELIANCE 
Legal fictions are ubiquitous in law.27  They have engendered 
a lot of criticisms and concerns and they have defied precise 
definitions and classifications.28  Despite their prevalence, a 
review of scholarly discussions on legal fictions reveals that legal 
fictions are treated with suspicion at best.29  To provide a context 
for our discussion, this section briefly summarizes previous 
attempts to define legal fictions and scholarly concerns about 
them. 
A. Legal Fictions, A Definitional Challenge 
Despite their prevalence in our law, there does not appear to 
be a unanimous definition for a legal fiction.30  Professor Fuller 
provided the most widely accepted definition.31  He defined a 
fiction as either “(1) a statement propounded with a complete or 
partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement 
recognized as having utility.”32  For Professor Fuller, a statement 
needs to be false to qualify as a fiction.33  Professor Fuller 
recognized that part of the definitional challenge is that whether 
a doctrine qualifies as a fiction often depends on properties of 
language and terminology.34 
 
27 FULLER, supra note 1, at 1–2; Knauer, supra note 8, at 17. 
28 FULLER, supra note 1, at 1–2; Knauer, supra note 8, at 17. 
29 This Article does not intend to engage in a debate about the use of legal 
fictions or over their proper definition. Legal fictions have been debated elsewhere. 
See Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 2229–47 (summarizing historical discussions 
about and types of legal fictions); Harmon, supra note 2, at 2–16; Soifer, supra note 
7, at 876. This Article also does not attempt to classify legal fictions. For an attempt 
to classify legal fictions into classic and new categories. See generally Smith, supra 
note 8. 
30 See Harmon, supra note 2, at 2–16 (summarizing various historical debates 
related to legal fictions). 
31 FULLER, supra note 1, at 9. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 11. 
34 Id. at 11–12, 30–31. 
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Other writers have approached the definitional task from a 
functional perspective,35 defining legal fiction as “any assumption 
which conceals a change of law by retaining the old formula after 
the change has been made.”36  The result “is the expansion of law, 
whilst leaving it formally intact.”37  Another defined legal fictions 
as devices for attaining desired legal consequences or avoiding 
undesired legal consequences.38 
Despite differences in definitional approaches, legal fictions 
share common characteristics:  They rest on a false factual 
assumption and their use excuses courts from having to explain 
the rationale for their decisions.39 
B. When Do Courts Use Legal Fictions? 
Courts typically resort to legal fictions when faced with a 
dispute that they cannot resolve without violating an existing 
well-established legal principle.40  All legal fictions implicate the 
following scenario:  The court is faced with a dispute that it 
needs to resolve and the dispute implicates a well-established 
legal principle.  For ease of reference, consider the well-
established principle as Principle A and the factual context 
giving rise to Principle A as Fact A.  Consider the dispute before 
the court as Scenario B and the facts giving rise to the dispute as 
Fact B.  Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts are obligated 
to apply Principle A to resolve the similar dispute in Scenario B.41 
To illustrate, consider the context in which the attractive-
nuisance doctrine, a well-known legal fiction, came into 
existence.42  Historically landowners owed no duty to trespassers, 
 
35 See, e.g., Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147, 150 (1917) 
[hereinafter Surviving Fictions]. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Oliver R. Mitchell, Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or 
Detrimental to its Growth?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 253 (1893). 
39 To complicate the definitional issue further, some writers seem to use the 
word “fiction” to describe certain abstract concepts which do not exist in reality in 
any form except for words used, conflating the idea of fiction with reification. For an 
example of the use of the word “fiction” for that purpose see FULLER, supra note 1, at 
98–103, 130 n.65. This Article focuses only on legal fictions that assume falsely the 
existence of a fact, not those fictions which concretize abstract concepts. 
40 Smith, supra note 8, at 1437. 
41 20 AM. JUR. 2D CTS. § 128 (2017). 
42 D. E. Buckner, Annotation, Age and Mentality of Child as Affecting 
Application of Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 16 A.L.R. 3d 25, § 2(a) (1967) (exploring 
the background of the attractive-nuisance doctrine). 
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including children, other than to refrain from injuring them 
intentionally.43  For centuries, landowners enjoyed the protection 
under the no duty rule and relied on the rule defensively against 
liability for injuries due to the dangerous conditions of their 
premises.44  This rule governed unless the injured persons could 
be fitted into certain limited categories, for example, an invitee to 
the owner’s land.  The well-established no duty principle is an 
example of a Principle A. 
Further consider a court presented with a dispute involving 
children who trespassed onto a landowners’ land and were 
injured as a result,45 an example of a Scenario B.  If the court 
were to apply Principle A in this scenario, the landowner would 
not be held liable for the children’s injuries.  Also note that even 
though common law courts recognized children’s welfare was 
worthy of the law’s protection, courts were reluctant to admit 
that a negligent landowner could be held liable to a trespasser.46 
This dilemma led to the judicial invention of a legal fiction—
the “attractive-nuisance” doctrine.47  This doctrine rests on a 
fiction that the injured child was invited to the defendant’s land 
even though there was no factual dispute that the child was a 
trespasser.48  Under this doctrine, courts reasoned situations 
created by the landowners were attractive to children and the 
attraction was an implied invitation to them to come on the 
premises.49  This fiction thus allowed courts to raise the injured 
child to the status of an invitee, resulting in courts then 
justifiably holding landowners liable to “invitees.”50  The fiction 
thus allows courts to give protection to injured children without 
ostensibly sacrificing Principle A.51  However, by relying on the 
legal fiction in Scenario B, courts reach a result which actually 
 
43 Leon Green, Landowners’ Responsibility to Children, 27 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1948). 
44 William E. Townsley, Note, Negligence—Duty of Landowners to Infant 
Trespassers—Attractive-Nuisance Doctrine Discarded—Submission of Issues—Eaton 
v. R. B. George Investments, Inc., 260 S.W.2d 587 (Tex Sup. 1953), 32 TEX. L. REV. 
348, 349 (1954). 
45 Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 657 (1873); Keffe v. Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207, 208 (Minn. 1875). 
46 Sioux City, 84 U.S. at 660–61; Green, supra note 43, at 6–7. 
47 Green, supra note 43, at 7. 
48 Id. at 2; Townsley, supra note 44, at 349. 
49 Banker v. McLaughlin, 208 S.W.2d 843, 846–47 (1948). 
50 Green, supra note 43, at 7. 
51 Id. 
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undermines Principle A—courts impose liability on the 
landowner defendant even though the plaintiff was a 
trespasser.52 
C. Scholarly Concerns—Lies and Masks 
The above example shows why many scholars are skeptical 
of courts’ use of fictions.53  The attractive-nuisance doctrine rests 
on a complete factual falsehood and allows courts to reach a 
desired result without addressing a change of law.54  Because of 
their patent falsehood and ability to mask true judicial 
reasoning, legal fictions have engendered many concerns.  
Indeed, scholars’ attitudes towards legal fictions have ranged 
from pure hatred and disdain,55 to cautious endorsement.56 
Some writers are skeptical of legal fictions because they may 
mask the true reasons for courts’ decisions.57  These scholars 
view courts’ reliance on legal fictions as attempts to avoid having 
to justify their decisions.58  They see the courts’ use of legal 
fictions as inconsistent with some of our fundamental values—
honesty, candor, and transparency.59  For our system of 
democracy to function properly, the government has to conduct 
 
52 Id. 
53 This Article does not join in the debate about whether or not judicial use of 
legal fictions in general is desirable. 
54 Shannon F. Eckner, Comment, Safeguard Trespassing Children and Preserve 
Property Rights: The Ohio Supreme Court Decision in Bennett v. Stanley to 
Implement the Second Restatement of Torts' Version of the Attractive Nuisance 
Doctrine, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 255, 269 (2002). 
55 FULLER, supra note 1, at 2. 
56 Sir William Blackstone, a supporter of legal fictions, is quoted as saying 
“while we may applaud the end, we cannot admire the means” in reference to legal 
fictions. Id. at 3. 
57 Robin Matthews, Legal Fictions: Critical Theory Criticality and the State of 
Economics and Management, in CRITICAL THEORY ETHICS FOR BUSINESS AND 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (ETHICS IN PRACTICE) 159, 160 (David M. Boje ed., 2009) 
(“Legal fictions are a form of organizational grammar, a veil, a mask such that, 
though it is merely one of many masks, can appear to be the only mask: a mask that 
can be confused with reality or even become reality itself.”); Daniel Hinkle, Note, 
Cynical Realism and Judicial Fantasy, 5 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 289, 329 (2013). 
58 See Matthews, supra note 57; Hinkle, supra note 57. 
59 Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the Post-
9/11 World, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1458 (2014) (commenting that courts would 
do well to be candid and issue opinions that would reveal their own doubts and 
difficulties to facilitate a civic dialogue over the risk we will or will not tolerate in 
regard to terrorism threats); Hinkle, supra note 57, at 329; Smith, supra note 8, at 
1441. 
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its business openly and transparently.60  Transparency allows the 
people to hold the government accountable.61  Because legal 
fictions allow courts to avoid articulating the reasons for 
decisions, the perception may be created that the judge is trying 
to hide something that undermines the legitimacy of our courts.62 
In addition, all legal fictions involve some sort of a 
falsehood.63  Judges represent the government and how they 
decide cases is fundamentally important to the rule of law in our 
society.64  Judges telling “lies” can be seen as discrediting the 
justice system.65 
Despite those concerns, scholars recognize the utility of legal 
fictions.66  Fuller, for example, described legal fictions as “the 
cement that is always at hand to plaster together the weak spots 
in our intellectual structure” and “the product of the law’s 
struggles with new problems.”67  He called fiction a “fundamental 
trait of human reason.”68  He suggested that engaging in legal 
fiction is our brain’s capacity to simplify and organize our reality 
and to understand reality through analogies.69 
 
 
60 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 
(Jan. 21, 2009). 
61 FULLER, supra note 1, at 97 n.6. 
62 Hinkle, supra note 57, at 329. 
63 For example, Bentham calls "legal fiction" "the most pernicious and the 
basest sort of lying." 6 Jeremy Bentham, Of Offices for Conservations of Transcripts 
of Contracts, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 575, 582 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
And he further says:  ''It affords presumptive and conclusive evidence of moral 
turpitude in those by whom it was invented and first employed." 9 Jeremy Bentham, 
Delusion, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 76, 77 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
64 Hinkle, supra note 57, at 290. 
65 Mitchell, supra note 38, at 254; see also Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 2222–23 (2015) (pointing out that our system of law is 
one that is built on trust for it to function). 
66 FULLER, supra note 1, at 21–22; Harmon, supra note 2, at 6–8 (noting 
Blackstone’s comments related to legal fictions as “highly beneficial and useful”); 
GRAY, supra note 4, at 37; Knauer, supra note 8, at 3; Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 
2249. 
67 FULLER, supra note 1, at 52, 94. 
68 Id. at 94. 
69 Id. at 104, 106, 113–114. 
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D. Warnings of Dangers 
However, the general recognition of legal fictions’ utility is 
tinged with warnings of danger.70  Professor Gray described 
fictions as handy if “skillfully and wisely” used.71  He also 
commented that fictions can be “dangerous[] tools.”72  He 
suggested that when using a legal fiction, one should always be 
conscious of the fact that one is using a fiction and be able to 
articulate the doctrine for which it stands.73 
Professor Fuller also warned about relying on a fiction in 
situations not anticipated by those who developed the fiction.74  
In Fuller’s mind, legal fictions can be “highly dangerous” when 
used in this manner.75  He also stated that full awareness of the 
falsity of a doctrine rendered a fiction safe.76  He noted that 
awareness of the fiction’s falsity would offer sufficient safeguards 
against harm and that the more users were aware of the falsity, 
the less dangerous the fiction was.77  He commented that “[a] 
fiction if taken seriously, i.e., ‘believed,’ becomes dangerous and 
loses its utility.”78  Professor Fuller did not elaborate on how 
someone can become aware of a fiction’s falsity or how and why 
awareness would make a fiction less dangerous. 
More recently, some scholars have singled out certain legal 
fictions as dangerous by focusing on the consequences of courts’ 
reliance on them.79  For example, Professor Kuckes pointed out 
that the legal fiction of grand jury independence allowed the 
courts to justify giving the grand jury broad investigative powers 
not given to law enforcement directly.80  Professor Harmon 
suggested that the fiction of the substituted judgement doctrine 
was dangerous because of its “borrowability” from the law of  
 
 
70 Harmon, supra note 2, at 15; see id. at 61 (“A legal fiction may be benign in 
one context, and dangerous and brutal in another.”). 
71 GRAY, supra note 4, at 37. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 FULLER, supra note 1, at 107. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 10. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 9–10. 
79 Harmon, supra note 2, at 68; Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of 
Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 38 (2004). 
80 Kuckes, supra note 79, at 38. 
MPP_LEONHARD 12/6/2017  9:00 PM 
2017] DANGEROUS OR BENIGN LEGAL FICTIONS 395 
lunacy into the law of informed consent, which allowed the state 
to invade the bodily integrity of the incompetent without having 
to provide an explanation.81 
In sum, scholarly discussions of legal fictions reveal the 
difficulty of identifying precisely what a legal fiction is.82  Despite 
concerns, legal fictions can be useful intellectual tools.83  
Notwithstanding their usefulness, legal fictions can be used in a 
dangerous manner.84 
II. HOW WE THINK AND OUR BLIND SPOTS 
Because legal fictions are used as analytical tools in the 
decision-making process, it is helpful to have a better 
understanding of how humans make decisions in general.  
Luckily, during the last four decades, psychologists and 
behavioral economists have undertaken numerous scientific 
studies on how we humans think and make decisions.85  Such 
scientific studies find that humans most often think intuitively 
and, although our intuition may be correct at times, intuitive 
thinking consistently leads to decisional errors.86  This Article 
suggests that our flawed minds may render a legal fiction 
dangerous.  As we shall discuss in more detail in Part III, in light 
of our cognitive biases, certain characteristics of legal fictions 
may make them benign or dangerous.87 
A. System 1 Intuitive Versus System 2 Deliberative Thinking 
Studies have shown that human beings have two different 
modes of thinking: intuitive and deliberate.88  Scientists refer to 
the intuitive mode as System 1.89  System 1 operates 
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of  
 
 
81 Harmon, supra note 2, at 63–66. 
82 See Surviving Fictions, supra note 35, at 150. 
83 Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 2235. 
84 See Harmon, supra note 2, at 14–15, 61 (arguing that substituted judgment is 
a useful fiction that may be dangerous when applied in the wrong context). 
85 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 4–5. 
86 Id. 
87 See infra Part III. 
88 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 20–23. 
89 Id. at 20–21. 
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voluntary control.90  The other mode of thinking is more 
deliberate and careful.91  Scientists refer to this mode as System 
2.92 
System 1 plays the dominant role in our thinking.93  It 
operates constantly and automatically and implicates innate 
skills we share with animals, as well as uniquely human mental 
activities that become fast and automatic through experience and 
prolonged practice—skills such as reading and understanding 
nuances of social and cultural situations.94  We cannot turn off 
System 1 at will.95  System 1 produces answers quickly and often 
relies on mental shortcuts called “heuristics” to reach conclusions 
and make decisions.96  It views reality by looking for coherence.97  
In other words, System 1 refers to the type of thinking often 
described as “a machine for jumping to conclusions.”98 
In contrast, System 2 involves conscious reasoning 
addressing difficult topics.  Because this mode requires more 
effort and is more difficult, this mode is activated when our brain 
detects something that violates the cognitive model of the world 
that System 1 maintains.99  System 2 regulates instinctive 
impulses and actions suggested by System 1, allowing some to be 
expressed while suppressing or modifying others.100  Because 
System 2 can apply rules, compare objects across multiple 
attributes, and deliberately choose between options, it is 
uniquely suited for complex reasoning and mathematical 
prediction.101  In other words, System 2 thinking is the type of 
thinking required for legal reasoning.102 
 
 
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 26–28. 
94 Id. at 21–22. 
95 Id. at 25, 28. 
96 Id. at 95–99. 
97 Id. at 80. 
98 Id. at 79–80. 
99 Id. at 20–21, 80–81. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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Thinking intuitively has some advantages.103  It can be 
highly efficient because it operates quickly and requires little 
effort.104  However, problems are often created due to over 
reliance on initial solutions generated by System 1 and failure to 
invoke System 2 thinking because of the hard work and 
deliberate effort required to activate it.105  System 1 thinking is 
constantly generating intuitive thoughts and suggestions when 
faced with challenges.106  As a result, System 1 tends to govern 
most decision making even though it is not well equipped for 
complex tasks.107 
B. Common Cognitive Biases 
Because of our tendency to rely heavily on intuition, when 
making complex decisions we make systematic and predictable 
judgment errors due to System 1’s inability to perform complex 
reasoning and its reliance on heuristics—mental shortcuts.108  
Such biases make us “predictably irrational” in several ways.109  
One of the mental short cuts is our tendency to automatically 
substitute an easy question for a more difficult one if we cannot 
easily come up with a satisfactory answer to the difficult 
question.110  System 1’s preference for quick answers predisposes 
it to find a related, easier question.111  Then, instead of answering 
the difficult question, we will find a related question and answer 
it.112  For example, when asked how child molesters should be 
punished, people will automatically answer the easier question of 
how they feel about child molesters, rather than considering the 
complicated issues raised by the question.113  Because System 1 is 
often not directly answering the relevant question, its solutions 
are understandably imprecise.114  System 2 can always reject or  
 
 
103 Id. at 20–21, 105. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 81. 
106 Id. at 24, 28. 
107 Id. at 21–22, 24, 28. 
108 Id. at 80; DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT 
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 5–7 (Harper Perennial, rev. & expanded ed. 2010). 
109 ARIELY, supra note 108, at xx, 5–7. 
110 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 97. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 98–99. 
114 Id. 
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modify these intuitive solutions.  However, because it requires 
more effort to activate System 2, System 1’s solutions are often 
accepted without modification.115 
Another way we automatically substitute a difficult question 
with an easier one is reflected through the “availability 
heuristic.”116  The availability heuristic refers to our tendency to 
estimate the likelihood of an event by the ease with which 
instances of it come to mind.117  It is more difficult to answer the 
likelihood question by examining the statistical data.118  Instead, 
we answer the easier question:  Can we recall instances of the 
event?119  The easier it is to recall the event, the more likely that 
we will overestimate its occurrence.120  While this substitution 
may be efficient in some instances, it often distorts our 
estimations because events can be memorable for reasons having 
nothing to do with their general prevalence.121 
“Predictably irrational” decision biases may also occur due to 
reliance on stereotypes as mental shortcuts—referred to as the 
“representativeness heuristic.”122  This shortcut leads us to ignore 
data in favor of what is consistent with our stereotypes—a 
substitution that frequently leads to mistakes.123  Most notably, 
relying on the representativeness heuristic causes people to 
neglect objective data in favor of superficially self-apparent, 
similarities.124 
Another cognitive bias is the “anchoring effect.”125  This 
refers to the impact of a particular numeric value on people’s 
estimation of quantity.126  Studies have shown that when 
litigants were initially offered one of two amounts, either $10,000 
or $2,000, the litigants who received the $2,000 offer were more 
likely to settle at $12,000 than those who received the initial 
 
115 Id. at 99. 
116 Id. at 130. 
117 Id. at 129. 
118 Id. at 130. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 129, 132. 
121 See id. at 130. 
122 Id. at 147–51. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. Fuller recognizes that the human mind is a machine subject to certain 
limitations. Human beings understand anything that is unfamiliar to them by 
analogy to the known world. FULLER, supra note 1, at 65. 
125 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 119. 
126 Id. 
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offer of $10,000.127  The litigants who settled at $12,000 were 
affected by the initial value of $2,000.128  In other words, people 
make decisions by starting from an initial value, with System 1 
automatically adjusting to yield the final answer.  This anchoring 
effect exists even though the initial number is random and 
unrelated to the question at hand.129  The studies found that 
judges also suffered from the same anchoring effect.130 
Similar to the anchoring effect, our thoughts and behaviors 
may also be influenced subtly through priming without us being 
conscious of it.131  Scientists call this the priming effect.132  
Research on the priming effect suggests that actions can be 
affected by what we see or hear, without us being aware of it.133  
For example, exposure to advertisements can trigger the priming 
effect within System 1 and result in consumers unconsciously 
choosing related brands of merchandise.134 
Furthermore, human beings are naturally inclined to 
interpret facts to support their own positions.135  System 1 is 
generally insensitive to the quantity and quality of information 
underlying its decisions and tends to suppress doubt in favor of 
coherence and easy solutions.136  When faced with potential 
uncertainty, System 1 comes up with a coherent story.137  Even if 
based on minimal evidence because of insensitivity to 
informational quality, the confidence that individuals have in 
their answers depends largely on the story’s quality, not the 
evidence’s strength.138  Thus, even when a person is only exposed 
to limited evidence, thereby increasing the chance of missing 
critical information, as long as System 1 constructs a good story 
based on that evidence, the individual will express unjustified 
confidence in the decision. 
 
127 Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 789. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. (noting the same effect even if the damages requests were “silly and 
outrageous”); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 125. 
130 Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 792–93. 
131 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 52–53. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 53–54. 
134 Id. at 57–58. 
135 See id. at 45. 
136 Id. at 80–82. 
137 Id. at 80. 
138 Id. at 87. 
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Studies have shown that people tend to interpret 
information in a self-serving manner, a phenomenon also 
referred to as self-serving or confirmatory bias.139  For example, a 
series of studies reported that a group of law students were given 
identical factual information about a dispute.  The students who 
were told that they represented the plaintiff interpreted the 
information as favorable to the plaintiff while the group told to 
represent the defendant viewed the same information as 
favorable to the defendant.140  Similarly, when supplied with the 
same facts about the death penalty, people initially against the 
death penalty reported that the information supported their 
initial position while those in favor of the death penalty reported 
that the information supported their initial pro death penalty 
position.141  “[W]e can be blind to the obvious, and we are also 
blind to our blindness.”142 
Judges, being human, are not immune from the way human 
beings make decisions and the resulting cognitive biases.143  
Despite their specialized training, judges are inclined to make 
intuitive judgments.144  The law does not and cannot address all 
real-life situations.145  Therefore, judges must fill in the gaps and 
in so doing grapple with the same kinds of perception biases as 
anyone else.146 
Legal fictions, then, are one thinking tool that judges rely on 
as they evaluate highly complex cases.147  Legal fictions are 
System 1 mental shortcuts that judges rely upon to solve a 
dispute in front of them.148  A legal fiction may become dangerous 
if human cognitive biases lead judges to excessively rely on the  
 
 
139 Id. at 81; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1093 (2000). 
140 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 139, at 1093. 
141 Id. 
142 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 24. 
143 Hinkle, supra note 57, at 291; Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2007); Smith, supra note 8, at 
1480–81. 
144 Guthrie et. al., supra note 143, at 27–28. 
145 Hinkle, supra note 57, at 291. 
146 Id.; Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 821. 
147 Hinkle, supra note 57, at 291. 
148 See GRAY, supra note 4, at 37. 
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legal fiction.149  The following section discusses how we can 
distinguish a benign legal fiction from a dangerous legal fiction 
in light of human cognitive biases. 
III. DANGEROUS OR BENIGN LEGAL FICTIONS 
Professor Fuller suggested that legal fictions become “wholly 
safe” if users are fully aware of their falsity.150  Empirical 
psychological research supports Professor Fuller’s observation in 
that awareness can help judges overcome System 1 intuitive 
thinking and trigger more deliberate System 2 thinking 
processes.151 
A natural question to ask at this point is:  How do judges 
become aware that a doctrine is fictitious?  One obvious answer is 
that maybe judges can educate themselves.152  The problem with 
the preceding answer is that it requires a judge to recognize a 
legal fiction and further realizes that she suffers from certain 
cognitive biases and there is a need for further education.  In 
other words, System 2 thinking needs to be triggered to engage 
in more deliberative thinking.153  That, however, is precisely 
where the rub is. 
A close examination of legal fictions reveals that some 
fictitious legal doctrines have built-in reminders of their 
falsity.154  This Article suggests that the built in reminders serve 
to remind judges of the fictitious nature of the doctrine and the 
need to engage in more deliberative thinking.  That awareness, 
therefore, offers some safeguards against excessive reliance on 
the fictitious legal doctrines.  In other words, the built in 
 
149 Id. 
150 FULLER, supra note 1, at 10. Professor Fuller did not provide any guidance, 
however, how one may become aware of a fiction’s falsity. 
151 Hinkle, supra note 57, at 329; Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 
821–22. 
152 Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 821–22. 
153 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 80–81. 
154 This Article discusses certain types of legal fictions as illustrations; it does 
not intend to capture all possible legal fictions. For one thing, it is impossible to 
identify all legal fictions in different areas of law. The big challenge with any 
discussion related to legal fictions is that legal fictions’ complexity defies any easy 
categorization. Categorization is also difficult because of lack of a precise definition 
of what a legal fiction is. 
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reminders may render a legal fiction benign.155  Legal fiction 
without such built-in reminders may be dangerous because of the 
risk that judges may rely on the fiction excessively and 
uncritically because of their cognitive biases.156 
This section identifies certain groups of legal fictions with 
such built-in reminders of their falsity.  This Article suggests 
that this may be one way for us to systematically identify when a 
legal fiction is benign or dangerous. 
A. Linguistic Clues of Falsity 
Some legal fictions come with labels identifying them as 
fiction.  Those legal fictions come with the words such as 
“implied,” “quasi,” or “constructive.”  These words remind judges 
that the doctrine is fictitious.  For example, in contract law, 
courts have found enforceable contracts by relying on the fiction 
of “implied” contracts.157 
There are two types of implied contracts fictions under 
contract law.  The first is a contract implied in fact.  This 
contract is a fiction because the parties did not enter into an 
express agreement.  Rather, the courts inferred from the parties’ 
conduct that the parties meant to enter into a contract.158  For 
example, courts have found a contract implied in fact where a 
person performs services at another’s request, or “where services 
are rendered by one person for another without his expressed 
request, but with his knowledge, and under circumstances” fairly 
raising the presumption that the parties understood and 
intended that compensation was to be paid.159 
The second is a contract implied in law, sometimes also 
referred to as quasi contract.  The “contract” here is not based on 
parties’ agreement; rather, it is an obligation created by the 
 
155 This Article does not suggest that a legal fiction with built in reminders can 
never be applied dangerously. For an example of a legal fiction that became 
dangerous because of its borrowability, see Harmon, supra note 2, at 63. 
156 See Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 779–80. 
157 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:6 
(4th ed. 2017). 
158 Id. 
159 See, e.g., Lewis v. Meginniss, 12 So. 19, 21 (Fla. 1892). In these 
circumstances, the law implies the promise to pay a reasonable amount for the 
services. Id. 
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law.160  Judges adopted the fiction to provide a remedy where one 
party was unjustly enriched, where that party received a benefit 
under circumstances that made it unjust to retain it without 
giving compensation.161  To find a contract implied in law, courts 
must find that (1) the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the 
defendant; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the benefit; (3) the 
defendant has accepted or retained the benefit conferred and 
(4) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for 
the defendant to retain the benefit without paying fair value for 
it.162 
Words such as “implied,” “quasi,” or “constructive,” then 
serve as linguistic reminders that the doctrines we are dealing 
with are fictitious.  These reminders may trigger more 
deliberative System 2 thinking as they remind judges to apply 
the doctrines cautiously.163  Therefore, legal fictions that come 
with linguistic reminders of their falsity are benign legal fictions 
because judges are more likely to be aware of their cognitive 
biases and as a result, engage in more deliberative System 2 
thinking.164 
B. Complete Factual Falsity 
Some legal fictions rest upon complete factual falsity, such 
that everyone knows that it is false and no one is deceived by its 
falsity.165  For example, the attractive-nuisance doctrine rests on 
a fact that is totally false—the child was invited to the land when 
there was no dispute that the landowner did not invite the 
child.166  Everybody knows that the landowner did not invite the 
child to the land.167  The legal fiction of corporation as a person is 
another example.168  In that case, everyone knows corporations 
are not human beings.169 
 
160 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:6 
(4th ed. 2017). 
161 Wright v. Pennamped, 657 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
162 Hillman Constr. Corp. v. Wainer, 636 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994). 
163 Guthrie et al., supra note 143, at 27–28, 41. 
164 Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 26–27. 
165 See, e.g., Eckner, supra note 54, at 269. 
166 See Green, supra note 43, at 2; Townsley, supra note 44, at 348–49. 
167 See Green, supra note 43, at 2; Townsley, supra note 44, at 348–49. 
168 Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal 
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 563 (1986–1987). 
169 Id. 
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The complete factual falsity serves as a reminder of the 
doctrine’s fictional nature because everyone knows it to be 
false.170  The risk that anyone would be deceived by the fiction is 
small because of how humans think.  System 1 thinking tries to 
understand the world through coherence.171  Complete factual 
falsity is inconsistent with System 1’s worldview.172  The 
complete falsity presents a jarring picture of the world to human 
intuition, System 1, and serves as a reminder that the doctrine is 
a fiction.173  This awareness may serve to activate System 2 
thinking as it reminds courts to apply the doctrine cautiously and 
limit its application.174 
C. Ideological Inconsistency 
Some legal fictions allow courts to reach results inconsistent 
with well-established legal or social values.  For example, the 
application of the attractive-nuisance doctrine allows the court to 
impose liability on the landowner.175  The imposition of liability 
violated a well-established principle that a landowner owed no 
duty to trespassers, including children.176 
Vicarious liability is another legal fiction which allows courts 
to impose liability upon one person because of another person’s 
misdeeds.177  The result is inconsistent with our belief that one 
should not be held liable for the acts of a third party.178  The 
ideological inconsistency is in conflict with System 1, resulting in 
cognitive dissonance.179  To use Professor Fuller’s words, the 
inconsistency makes the fiction a “bitter pill to swallow.”180 
The “bitter pill” effect can serve as a trigger to activate 
System 2 thinking and thus offers some necessary checks and 
balances against overuse, for example, by reminding judges to  
 
 
170 FULLER, supra note 1, at 10. 
171 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 105. 
172 See id. at 59–62. 
173 See id.; FULLER, supra note 1, at 10. 
174 Guthrie et al., supra note 143, at 27–28, 41. 
175 Green, supra note 43, at 2; Townsley, supra note 44, at 348–49. 
176 Eckner, supra note 54, at 269. 
177 DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Fin. Co., 882 A.2d 561, 565 (R.I. 2005). 
178 FULLER, supra note 1, at 26. 
179 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 59–70. 
180 FULLER, supra note 1, at 26. 
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engage in a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis in applying the 
doctrine.  Because of the inconsistency, one can expect the judges 
to be cautious when applying the principle.181 
In sum, legal fictions that have some built-in reminders are 
benign because the reminders serve to activate System 2 
thinking, resulting in better decision making.  On the other 
hand, legal fictions that do not have any reminders of their 
falsity have the potential to be overused uncritically as a result of 
human cognitive biases.  Judicial reliance on legal fictions 
exacerbates concerns about legal fictions.  The next Section 
focuses on consent in contract law as an example of a legal fiction 
that does not have any built-in reminders and the potential 
dangers it presents to our society. 
IV. THE MAKING OF THE CONSENT FICTION IN CONTRACT LAW 
In contract law, consent of the parties182 remains the 
justification for courts to exercise state power to enforce 
contracts.183  Even though commercial transactions have 
undergone fundamental changes—from face-to-face dealings in 
physical space to digital transactions in cyberspace—over the last 
century,184 requirements for enforcement of those contracts have 
by and large remained the same.185  Because consent refers to a 
human mental state and one cannot read a human mind,186 
 
181 Id. (“The harshness involved in visiting the consequences of one man's 
misdeeds upon another has seemed to call for repeated explanation and apology.”); 
Guthrie et al., supra note 143, at 27–28, 41. 
182 My scholarship interest on consent in contract law focuses on “consent” as 
when parties agree to a certain transaction. In that sense, consent in this Article is 
used interchangeably with “assent” or “agree.” Consent is often used in its more 
abstract sense as the central concept of a broader consent theory. The broader 
consent theory portrays the society as consisting of free, independent individuals 
who control their own destiny, providing the theoretical foundation for the consent 
approach in contract law. DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT 
THEORY 1 (1989). 
183 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: 
Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1394–95 
(1996). 
184 Gary E. Sullivan, Purchasing from Merchants on eBay® and the Implied 
Warranty of Merchantability: An Overview, 70 ALA. LAW. 266, 266 (2009). 
185 Forrest v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1011 (D.C. 2002) (“A 
contract is no less a contract simply because it is entered into via a computer.”). 
186 Morris R. Cohen, On the Logic of Fiction, 20 J. PHIL. 477, 478 (1923) 
(“Indeed, whenever we speak of the mind doing anything, collecting its data, 
perceiving the external world, and the like, we are using the metaphor of reification, 
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courts have always looked for outward indicia, such as 
reifications, of consent when deciding whether contracts should 
be enforced.187 
In the late 19th century, contractual transactions were often 
face-to-face dealings.188  In such cases, a party’s signature is 
treated as reification of consent.189  As business grew and used 
standard agreements, courts began accepting notice or purchase 
of goods as evidence of consent.190  Nowadays, many commercial 
transactions occur in the digital world and courts have found 
consent where a party clicked on an “Accept” button or browsed a 
website.191 
Growing evidence shows that usual reifications of consent—
signatures, clicking buttons, browsing websites—in modern 
consumer transactions do not necessarily mean that the party 
consented to the business terms.192  Many consumers do not read 
the agreements when they sign or when they click “I accept,” and 
with good reason.193  By now, few would dispute that consent as  
 
 
 
just as we use the metaphor of personification whenever we speak of bodies 
attracting and repelling each other.”). 
187 Alexander v. Codemasters Grp. Ltd., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 152 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002); see also Meyer v. Benko, 127 Cal. Rptr. 846, 848–49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
188 Nora K. Duncan, Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth Century Problem for a 
Nineteenth Century Code, 34 LA. L. REV. 1081, 1095 (1974). 
189 Marie-Andrée Jacob, Form-Made Persons: Consent Forms as Consent's Blind 
Spot, 30 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 249, 256 (2007). 
190 J. P. Ludington, Annotation, Construction and Effect of UCC Art. 2, Dealing 
with Sales, 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, § 7 (1968). 
191 Bassett v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 95, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
192 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2014). 
193 One famous example of this was reported in the Guardian about an 
experiment where everyone clicked “I accept” even though the terms of the 
agreement obligated the users to give up their first born or, if they don’t have any 
children, their most beloved pet. John Naughton, State Surveillance Is Enabled by 
Our Own Sloppy Habits, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www. 
theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/13/state-surveillance-enabled-by-own-sloppy-
habits?CMP=share_btn_link; see also Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 192, at 1749. 
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applied in contract law is mostly a legal fiction.194  Many scholars, 
myself included, have criticized courts for indulging in the 
consent legal fiction.195 
A. Reifications of Consent 
1. You signed and therefore you consented. 
Courts have widely adopted the rule that a party’s physical 
signature represents the party’s consent to the terms of the 
agreement.196  Courts treat written contracts as the highest 
evidence of the terms of an agreement and impose a duty on 
every contracting party to learn and know its contents before 
signing.197  Courts would enforce a contract against a party where 
the party signed the agreement even though the party claimed 
she did not read it.198 
The above rule made a lot of sense in the early days of 
contract law when commercial transactions were completed in 
person.  The rule also promotes diligence by requiring parties to 
act prudently when entering into a contract.199  A contrary rule 
would have destroyed the utility of the contract mechanism 
because, as Justice Hunt put it, “If this were permitted, contracts 
would not be worth the paper on which they are written.”200 
 
194 John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 287 (2000); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 192 (2003) (calling the fiction of 
consent “ludicrous”). 
195 FULLER, supra note 1, at 3 (noting the general tendency of scholars to 
criticize a legal doctrine on the basis that it is a “fiction”); Chunlin Leonhard, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 78 
(2012). 
196 Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875); Hawkins v. Capital Fitness, Inc., 
29 N.E.3d 442, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
197 Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1948). 
198 Upton, 91 U.S. at 50; see also MCC–Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica 
Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[P]arties who 
sign contracts will be bound by them regardless of whether they have read them or 
understood them.”). 
199 Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty To Read—Business Run 
by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 
1058 (1966). 
200 Upton, 91 U.S. at 50. 
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2. You saw the terms and therefore you consented. 
As the economy developed, more and more businesses began 
adopting form contracts as an economical way to convey identical 
terms to large groups of people.201  Courts adopted the position 
that by noticing the terms and not returning the product, the 
buyer agreed to the terms of the contract.202  By equating notice 
with consent, courts moved a step closer to the fictionalization of 
consent. 
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the United States 
Supreme Court enforced a forum-selection clause included among 
three pages of terms attached to a boarding ticket for a cruise 
ship vacation.  The plaintiff boarded the cruise ship in California 
to sail to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.203  While the ship was in 
international waters, the plaintiff fell and injured herself.204  The 
Shutes filed suit in the United States District Court in 
Washington claiming injuries caused by defendant Carnival 
Cruise Line’s negligence.205  The defendant moved for summary 
judgment, contending that the forum-selection clause in 
plaintiff’s ticket required the Shutes to bring their suit in a 
Florida court.206 
The majority of the Court did not address the question of 
whether the buyer had sufficient notice of the forum-selection 
clause before entering into the contract.  The Court noted that 
the buyers had essentially conceded they had notice of the forum-
selection clause.207  The majority did concede that the buyers did 
 
201 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 4.9 (9th ed. 2014); Nw. 
Nat'l Ins. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Form contracts . . . enable 
enormous savings in transaction costs . . . .”). 
202 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991); see, e.g., 
Bowen v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 314, 315 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) 
(passengers received tickets ten days before sailing, after the fare had been paid in 
full, and prices were non-refundable); Golden v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 4 Misc. 3d 33, 
36; 780 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704; 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 24154 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2nd Dep’t 
2004) (passenger had ticket for two to three weeks before learning of father’s illness 
necessitating cancellation). 
203 Shute, 499 U.S. at 588. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 590. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the 
majority’s assumption and pointed out that only the most meticulous passenger is 
likely to become aware of the forum-selection provision. Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). To demonstrate the point, he noted that he “appended to [his] opinion a 
facsimile of the relevant text, using the type size that actually appears in the ticket 
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not have an opportunity to negotiate with the cruise line the 
terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial 
cruise ticket.208 
The Supreme Court never questioned whether the plaintiffs 
actually consented to those terms and instead assumed that 
notice of the terms equaled “accession [sic]” to the terms.209  The 
majority justified its decision by providing several reasons as to 
why the clause should be enforced.210  The Court reasoned that a 
cruise line had a special interest in limiting the fora in which it 
could be potentially sued, because a cruise ship carried 
passengers from many locations and a mishap on a cruise could 
subject the cruise line to litigation in several different 
locations.211  In addition, the Court found that the forum-
selection clauses could save litigants time and expense and 
conserve judicial resources by dispelling any confusion about 
where the lawsuits had to be filed.212  Finally, the Court added 
that the passengers benefited from a forum-selection clause 
because of reduced fares as a result of the limitation imposed by 
the forum-selection clause.213 
3. You were informed of the terms and therefore you consented. 
Subsequent to the Carnival Cruise Lines cases, courts began 
enforcing agreements wrapped or packaged within products even 
though a buyer could not see the terms at the time of purchase.214  
These cases typically enforce the terms against the buyer who 
purchased the product and was presumed to have had an 
 
itself. A careful reader will find the forum-selection clause in the 8th of the 25 
numbered paragraphs” because  
[o]f course, many passengers, like the respondents in this case . . . will not 
have an opportunity to read paragraph 8 until they have actually 
purchased their tickets. By this point, the passengers will already have 
accepted the condition set forth in paragraph 16(a), which provides that 
“[t]he Carrier shall not be liable to make any refund to passengers in 
respect of . . . tickets wholly or partly not used by a passenger.” 
Id. 
208 Id. at 593 (majority opinion). 
209 Id. at 595. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 585. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 586. 
214 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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opportunity to read the terms later at home.215  By keeping the 
product after reading the terms, courts reasoned that buyers 
agreed to be bound by the terms.216 
In ProCD v. Zeidenberg, Plaintiff ProCD produced a CD-
ROM, entitled SelectPhone, containing the database of 
information from telephone directories and a proprietary search 
engine.217  The court pointed out that the database in 
SelectPhone (trademark) cost more than $10 million to compile 
and was expensive to maintain.218  ProCD offered a consumer 
version of its product at a substantially lower price than the 
commercial version for sale.219  Plaintiff sold the compact disc in 
retail software packages covered in plastic and each package 
stated that the software was subject to an enclosed license.220 
Defendant Zeidenberg purchased a consumer copy of 
SelectPhone.  In violation of the enclosed license, he resold the 
information contained in the SelectPhone database to the public 
at a price less than that ProCD charged its commercial 
customers.221  ProCD filed suit to obtain an injunction prohibiting 
any distribution of the product in violation of the license 
agreement.222  The district court held that the license terms were 
invalid because they did not appear on the outside of the 
package.223  Zeidenberg, the district court reasoned, could not 
have agreed to such hidden terms at the time of his purchase.224  
Rather, the court determined that only terms disclosed prior to 
purchase formed part of the contract.225 
The Seventh Circuit reversed.226  Judge Easterbrook 
analyzed the enforceability of the license by ostensibly applying 
common law contract law principles and the Uniform 
 
215 Roger C. Bern, "Terms Later" Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and 
A Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 
641, 644 (2004). 
216 ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453. 
217 Id. at 1449. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1450. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 1455. 
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Commercial Code.227  In an apparent effort to justify his decision, 
Judge Easterbrook reasoned that “[n]otice on the outside, terms 
on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if 
the terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly 
extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers 
and sellers alike.”228  He found that the defendant was bound by 
the license terms by conduct.229  The defendant purchased the 
product, and by keeping the product after having had a chance to 
read the license terms, he accepted those terms.230 
4. You clicked and therefore you consented. 
With the advent of the digital age, businesses have 
established an online presence.  Courts were again presented 
with enforcing digital agreements, many of them standard form 
agreements with many boilerplate clauses.231  Website users are 
sometimes required to click an “I agree” box after being 
presented with a list of terms and conditions of use.  Such 
agreements are referred to as “clickwrap” agreements.232  
Sometimes, users do not see the terms and conditions of use, but 
can access them through a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen; 
those are often referred to as “browsewrap” agreements.233 
In Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., the plaintiff was 
required to click on an “Accept” button to serve as consent to the 
YoVille terms of service, which followed a blue hyperlink to those 
 
227 Id. at 1450. 
228 Id. at 1451. 
229 Id. at 1452. 
230 Id. at 1452–53. 
231 See Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369–70 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (sellers accepted marketplace website’s terms and conditions, including forum-
selection clause); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (D. Haw. 
2010) (clickwrap agreement valid under Texas law); Hughes v. McMenamon, 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Mass. 2002) (applying Massachusetts law holding that an 
Internet service provider’s terms of service applied, and that a forum-selection 
clause required dismissal of the case); Kilgallen v. Network Solutions, Inc., 99 F. 
Supp. 2d 125, 129–30 (D. Mass. 2000) (applying Virginia law holding that a 
clickwrap domain renewal agreement was binding on a domain name owner); 
America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that an Internet service provider’s terms of service were found to be a 
“freely negotiated agreement” that the plaintiffs had not shown was unreasonable or 
unjust). See generally Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 
2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Illinois law to hold that shareware license 
restrictions were enforceable against a defendant that bundled shareware for profit). 
232 Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
233 Id. 
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terms.234  The terms of service, which included an arbitration 
clause, were not visible to the plaintiff.235  The plaintiff admitted 
that she did click on the “Accept” button.236  On these facts, the 
court found that the plaintiff was provided with an opportunity 
to review the terms of service and held that a binding contract 
was created.237  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
the click did not put her on notice of what she was assenting to 
and that she was not bound by the terms.238  In other cases, 
courts found apparent consent where the business websites 
stated that website visitors agree to the terms by browsing the 
website content.239 
In conclusion, current case law shows that courts are 
assuming the existence of consent where web users clicked on 
“Accept” or “I Agree” boxes.240  Courts appear to be satisfied that 
consent exists where a user has adequate notice of the terms, 
“evidenced by the reasonable placement of such terms on the 
website, and an adequate time to object to such terms.”241 
B. Consent—From Reification to Fiction 
Studies have demonstrated that the reifications of consent 
relied upon by courts do not mean that the person truly 
consented to those terms.242  By relying on the reifications of 
consent as actual evidence of consent, courts are indulging in a 
fiction of consent.243  Many have pointed out that the consent 
doctrine as applied in contract law has become a legal fiction.244 
 
234 Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 911 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
235 Id. at 910. 
236 Id. at 911. 
237 Id. at 912. 
238 Id. 
239 Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Courts 
usually uphold browsewraps, where assent is shown by using the website, “if the 
user ‘has actual or constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and conditions prior to 
using the site.’ ” Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding that failure to read the online agreement will not excuse compliance with its 
terms). 
240 Deborah Davis Boykin, Survey of E-Contracting Cases: Browsewrap, 
Clickwrap, and Modified Clipwrap Agreements, 68 BUS. LAW. 257, 262 (2012). 
241 Id. 
242 See Bern, supra note 215, at 644. 
243 Professors Peter Smith and Knauer probably would have preferred to call the 
consent doctrine as a “new legal fiction” or “empirical legal error.” See Smith, supra 
note 8, at 1441–45; Knauer, supra note 8, at 6, 22–23. Professor Peter Smith 
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The previous case review shows that courts have treated 
physical signatures as evidence of consent.245  In some cases, 
courts have treated notice of the terms plus keeping the product 
as evidence of consent.246  In some cases where buyers purchased 
shrink-wrapped products, courts have taken the position that 
consent exists if a buyer has notice of the existence of an 
agreement when he purchased the product, had the opportunity 
to read it after the purchase, and had a right to return the 
product.247 
In reality, many consumers do not read the terms before 
signing or clicking.248  Scholars have pointed out that consumers 
do not bother to read the terms because they are not subject to 
negotiation and are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.249 
In some situations, consumers sign without reading the 
terms because they would not understand much of the boilerplate 
language even if they took the time to read it.250  Furthermore, if 
they read the terms and do not like the terms, consumers have 
nowhere else to turn to because businesses offering the same 
services or products usually employ comparable terms.251  Often, 
the consumer is also under some pressure from the business’s 
agent to sign quickly.252 
 
suggested that a new legal fiction exists if a judge relies on a factual premise that is 
false or inaccurate. Smith, supra note 8, at 1470 (“[W]hat characterizes most new 
legal fictions is that the learned reader of the law would not have explicit or implicit 
indication that the court is simply deeming to be true that about which we know 
otherwise. In addition, new legal fictions are not simply a device for softening (or, 
depending on one’s perspective, obscuring) the effects of legal change—that is, 
departure from a regime already established—but rather are instrumental in 
justifying doctrine, whether received or newly established.”). This Article does not 
intend to address the issue of how to classify the consent doctrine. 
244 Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 1, 79 (2011). 
245 Supra Part IV.A.1. 
246 Supra Part IV.A.3. 
247 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004); Schnabel v. 
Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). 
248 Burke, supra note 194, at 295; Goldman, supra note 194, at 190–92 (calling 
the fiction of consent “ludicrous”). 
249 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 192, at 1749. 
250 Id. 
251 See id. at 1753 (“The reality is that . . . everything comes with extensive 
standard terms.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 212, 243–44 (1995); Hart, supra note 244, at 17–18 
(describing “the extensive use of certain boilerplate contract clauses”). 
252 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 192, at 1749; Eisenberg, supra note 251, at 242. 
MPP_LEONHARD 12/6/2017  9:00 PM 
414 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:385   
In addition to such marketplace realities, humans’ decision-
making biases also contribute to consumers’ decision not to read 
the terms before signing or clicking “I accept.”253  For example, 
one human bias is the tendency to be overconfident.254  When a 
boilerplate agreement contains an arbitration clause, warranty 
disclaimer, or forum-selection clause, we tend to automatically 
dismiss the risks that stem from those provisions.255 
Another reason to be suspicious as to whether common 
reifications of consent—signatures, clicking, browsing—can truly 
be taken as indications of actual consent are the powerful 
commercial forces manipulating consumers.256  Subprime 
mortgage transactions offer an example of such manipulations.257  
Subprime mortgage lenders manipulated those with less 
information through deliberate contract design.258  Subprime loan 
products with cost-deferral features took advantage of people’s 
tendency to focus on short-term benefits and underestimate 
future risks.259  Such mortgage products were also deliberately 
designed to be so complicated that borrowers could not properly 
assess the risks, further calling into question whether borrowers 
truly consented.260 
In sum, it is clear that consent, as applied in contract law, 
often rests on the false assumption that reifications of consent 
are sufficient evidence of consent.  At least in many consumer 
transactions, courts have enforced terms against consumers 
where they did not consent to the specific terms, even though 
they may have signed the agreements, clicked on a button, or 
browsed a website.  Therefore, consent may be called a fiction in 
those cases.261 
 
253 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 199–208. 
254 Id. at 261–65. 
255 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 192, at 1749. 
256 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime 
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1120–21 (2009); Alan M. White, 
Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 158–60 (2009) (pointing out that the 
marketing industry spends billions of dollars on behavioral research to devise 
marketing strategies, which can increase sales). 
257 Bar-Gill, supra note 256, at 1079–80; White, supra note 256, at 158–60. 
258 Bar-Gill, supra note 256, at 1079–80; White, supra note 256, at 158–60. 
259 For a detailed discussion of how lenders exploited these decisional biases in 
consumer contract contexts, see White, supra note 256, at 158–160. 
260 EDMUND L. ANDREWS, BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT MORTGAGE 
MELTDOWN 77 (2009). 
261 This Article does not intend to debate the issue of whether consent qualifies 
as a legal fiction at all because signatures in business-to-business context can still 
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V. CONSENT—A DANGEROUS LEGAL FICTION 
The above discussion shows that some legal fictions come 
with built-in reminders of their fictitious nature—linguistic 
clues, complete factual falsity, or ideological inconsistency.262  
Such reminders render legal fictions benign because they prompt 
judges to engage in their System 2 thinking and to be more 
deliberative when applying the fiction.263 
The consent doctrine, however, has no such built-in 
reminders of its fictitious nature.  The lack of any reminders of 
its falsity makes the consent fiction “dangerous.”264  There is a 
great risk judges will over-rely on this fiction.  As explained 
below, judges’ System 1 intuitive thinking will tend to lead to 
excessive reliance on the consent fiction.265  A selected case 
review demonstrates courts and lawyers alike are accepting the 
consent fiction without any critical analysis.266  This uncritical 
reliance on the consent fiction by the courts has undermined the 
fundamental right to a day in court. 
A. The Consent Doctrine Has No Built-In Reminders 
The consent doctrine has none of the built-in reminders of its 
falsity that render some legal fictions benign.  The consent 
doctrine does not have any linguistic reminders of its falsity.  In 
cases where courts enforced express agreements between the 
parties, courts have done so by finding consent, not implied or 
constructive, where the parties signed an agreement, noticed a 
term or clicked a button.267 
The consent doctrine also does not rest on complete factual 
falsehood.  As previously discussed, a signature or click can be 
evidence of consent.268  In some cases, such reifications falsely 
 
serve as evidence of consent. Whether or not the consent doctrine qualifies as a 
fiction depends on whose definition one chooses to rely on. In addition, we should 
always keep in mind that a signature, at best, is only a reification of consent because 
no one can observe what is going on in the signor’s mind. 
262 See supra Part III. 
263 This does not mean that a benign legal fiction cannot be applied dangerously. 
For an example of a legal fiction that became dangerous because of its borrowability 
see Harmon, supra note 2, at 63–66. 
264 FULLER, supra note 1, at 9; Harmon, supra note 2, at 15, 61. 
265 See infra Part V.B. 
266 See generally Hart, supra note244, at 4–5. 
267 Supra Part IV.A. 
268 See discussion supra Part IV.A.4. 
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create the illusion of consent because studies have shown that 
people do not read terms before they sign or click.269  Complete 
factual falsity would undermine the coherence that judges 
intuitively seek when their System 1 thinking is engaged and 
would serve as a reminder that the doctrine is a fiction.  Instead 
of complete falsity, the consent doctrine rests on apparent indicia 
of consent—signature, notice, clicking or browsing—which are 
insufficient evidence of a party’s actual consent.  The consent 
fiction thus serves to reduce the courts’ evidentiary burden of 
proof in the dispute and promotes System 1 heuristic thinking by 
making it easier for a judge to rely on the fiction—a text book 
example of the natural tendency to substitute an easier question 
for a more difficult one.270 
Finally, the consent doctrine allows courts to reach a result 
that is ideologically consistent with well-established legal and 
moral principles: enforcing the contract as agreed upon by the 
parties and keeping one’s promises.271  This result ostensibly 
promotes individual autonomy and freedom of contract.272  A 
result inconsistent with well-established principles would have 
served as a reminder of its falsity; it would have made it a “bitter 
pill” to swallow, activating judges’ System 2 thinking mode.273  
The ideological consistency, however, makes the consent fiction a 
sweet pill, much more palatable to be swallowed.  This would not 
trigger the System 2 thinking because the consent fiction offers 
the coherence that System 1 thinking automatically seeks.274 
Because the consent doctrine lacks any built-in reminders of 
its falsity, there is a great risk that judges with only their System 
1 thinking mode engaged will rely on the fiction excessively.275  
This risk is especially great in light of cognitive biases as 
discussed below. 
 
 
269 Burke, supra note 194, at 294; Goldman, supra note 194, at 189. 
270 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 97. 
271 Leonhard, supra note 195, at 59. 
272 Id. 
273 See FULLER, supra note 1, at 26 (talking about the various fictions behind the 
notion of vicarious liability). 
274 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 80. 
275 Harmon, supra note 2, at 15, 60–61, 63. 
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B. Consent and Our Cognitive Biases 
The consent fiction offers coherence to members of our 
society where the consent concept occupies a special place.  We 
pride ourselves on individual autonomy and freedom.276  The 
consent concept in many ways allows us to embrace a world view 
coherent with the ideal image that we would like to have.277  And 
coherence is the guiding principle underlying the maintenance of 
“quick judgment” System 1 heuristic thinking.278  Judges, like all 
other humans, have a strong need for coherence.279  Respect for 
consent means respect for our individualism and autonomy.280  
Judges intuitively rely on consent as the basis for enforcing 
agreements when there is nothing reminding them that 
signature, clicking, and browsing are only reifications of consent, 
not complete proof of actual consent.281 
Because of the emotional appeal of the consent concept, there 
is a risk that judges, when deciding whether a party consented, 
will be unaware of the operation of a System 1 heuristic and will 
over-rely on the consent fiction to enforce an agreement.  As 
discussed earlier, human beings—judges are no exception—have 
a tendency to automatically substitute an easier question for a 
more difficult one.282  In this case, the question of whether there 
is any sign that the party agreed substitutes the more difficult 
question of whether the party actually consented.283  Since judges 
cannot read a party’s mind, it is easier to assume that the party 
consented to the agreement when he or she signed or clicked a 
button. 
 
276 HERZOG, supra note 182, at 215. 
277 Don Herzog in his book Happy Slaves has described this “familiar figure” 
that “haunts modern society . . . [as] the free agent, bound only by his own choices. 
He chooses a career, a spouse, a religion, a lifestyle, and more. He animates our 
moral and political arguments, our very idea of what a person is, and our social 
lives.” Id. at ix. 
278 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 80 (explaining how System 1 thinking 
lacks conscious doubt and uncertainty). 
279 See id. at 79–88 (discussing the human tendency for preferring consistency of 
information over completeness, and yearning for a generally coherent pattern). 
280 Erin Talati, When A Spoonful of Sugar Doesn't Help the Medicine Go Down: 
Informed Consent, Mental Illness, and Moral Agency, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 171, 
174 (2009). 
281 See Boykin, supra note 240, at 262. 
282 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 97. 
283 Id.; see also FULLER, supra note 1, at 122 (noting “the inveterate hang of the 
human mind toward simplicity”). 
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By choosing to accept the consent fiction and to enforce 
agreements on that basis, judges are able to avoid many difficult 
and fundamental questions.  Should the terms be imposed on the 
party when the party did not voluntarily consent to them?  What 
interests are being promoted when terms are imposed on parties 
even though they did not consent to those terms?  Are those 
interests worth the price of not honoring individual freedom of 
contract?  Is it fair to impose the terms on parties when they did 
not consent to them?284 
Relying on the consent fiction is also culturally expedient 
and safe.  No one can fault a judge for holding parties liable for 
what they signed.285  After all, individual freedom comes with 
individual accountability.  If you sign something, it is only 
natural that you are held to your promises.  The System 1 
thinking mode will ignore the little voice that says that the party 
may have signed the agreement without truly consenting and 
often even without reading or understanding the terms.286 
Some judges have gone to extraordinary length to maintain 
the consent fiction.  For example, in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, Judge 
Easterbrook announced that he merely was applying common 
law contract principles and the Uniform Commercial Code.287  He 
acknowledged that under Wisconsin law, “a contract includes 
only the terms on which the parties have agreed.”288  Judge 
Easterbrook nonetheless enforced a license against the purchaser 
even though the purchaser did not see the license terms at the 
time of purchase.289  It would have been illogical to claim that the 
buyer could consent to terms that he did not see at the time of 
purchase.290  Undeterred by the logical problem, Judge 
Easterbrook invented the “[n]otice on the outside, terms on the 
inside, and a right to return” as basis to enforce the contract  
 
 
284 See Surviving Fictions, supra note 35, at 326 (“Incidentally, it may be noted 
that this resort to fiction sometimes relieved the court from giving reasons for the 
existence of an obligation (from inquiring carefully into reasons for imposing 
absolute liability).”). 
285 FULLER, supra note 1, at 59 (describing the “motive of convenience”). 
286 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 81–82. 
287 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 1455. 
290 Bern, supra note 215, at 650–51, 708–09. 
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against the plaintiff.291  He never addressed the logical dilemma 
and instead justified the result by pointing out that enforcing the 
agreement benefitted both the businesses and consumers alike.292 
Judge Easterbrook’s stated rationale misses the point.  The 
fact that enforcement of the terms may be beneficial does not 
shed any light on whether the buyer in that case voluntarily 
accepted those terms.293  A more intellectually honest approach 
would have been to acknowledge that the buyer did not consent 
and justify the enforcement of the license because it was 
beneficial to the society as a whole.294  That, however, would have 
meant giving up the consent fiction, and Judge Easterbrook 
would have had to justify his choice of the identified social 
benefits over individual autonomy. 
In Carnival Cruise v. Shute, the majority of the Supreme 
Court did not address the issue of whether the plaintiff had 
sufficient notice of the forum-selection clause.  The Court 
conveniently assumed that the plaintiff had consented by relying 
on the plaintiffs’ apparent concession that they had notice of the 
terms.295  The Supreme Court drew this conclusion by relying on 
the statement from the plaintiffs’ brief: “The respondents do not 
contest the incorporation of the provisions nor [sic] that the 
forum selection clause was reasonably communicated to the 
respondents, as much as three pages of fine print can be 
communicated.”296  From that slender reed of evidence, the 
Supreme Court enforced the forum-selection clause  
 
 
291 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
292 Id. at 1455; see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th 
Cir. 1997); O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516–17 (M.D. La. 2003) 
(following the “money now, terms later” approach even though the court admitted 
that it was “unseemly” to enforce “terms and conditions contained in a product box 
that were not clearly pointed out at the time of sale.”). 
293 I am not challenging Judge Easterbrook’s result. I am just questioning the 
process through which he arrived at the result. I have previously advocated giving 
up the consent focused approach and enforcing an agreement based on a totality of 
circumstances test. Leonhard, supra note 195, at 85. 
294 Bern, supra note 215, at 644. 
295 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991). 
296 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (No. 89-1647) 1990 WL 10012717, at *26). 
The dissenting justices noted that “only the most meticulous passenger is likely to 
become aware of the forum-selection provision.” Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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and justified the enforcement by saying that enforcing the clause 
would benefit the passengers because of reduced fares and the 
cruiseliner’s forum-selection clause was not in bad faith.297 
Because of its intuitive appeal as a System 1 heuristic, 
consent can act as an intellectual shortcut.  Professor Fuller 
describes fiction as “the cement that is always at hand to plaster 
together the weak spots in our intellectual structure.”298  In our 
culture, no one is likely to challenge the notion that people 
should be held accountable.  For this reason, the consent fiction 
is very tempting.  Judges can easily be persuaded they are doing 
the right thing to enforce a contract and pay little attention to 
the fairness of its terms once they are comfortable that the other 
party has “consented” to the terms.  In other words, it can easily 
win over a judge’s conscience.299 
In attempting to explain judges’ motives in adopting a 
fiction, Professor Fuller used the analogy of an elderly woman 
invited to a ball and having to decide whether she should wear 
her only evening gown, which was three years old.300  He 
compared the legal fiction to the three-year-old gown that was 
slightly out of style.301  Following the same analogy, the consent 
fiction would be analogous to a beautiful evening gown.  Instead 
of being out of style, the gown would be in the most popular style.  
Putting on that gown would make the judge feel elegant and 
emotionally secure because it is consistent with how she would 
view herself and consistent with how and what the society at 
large would view and expect of her.302  Like all human beings, 
this elderly lady would succumb to temptations of the consent 
fiction.  Those are the fictions that we have to watch out for 
because they dull the senses and allow us to indulge contentedly 
in the coherent world constructed by System 1 thinking. 
C. The Dangers of Consent  
Because contractual agreements permeate every aspect of 
our economic relationships, courts’ indulgence in the consent 
fiction has had profound negative consequences in many 
 
297 Id. at 594–95 (majority opinion). 
298 FULLER, supra note 1, at 52. 
299 Id. at 64. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
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important areas.303  It has become a dangerous legal fiction relied 
upon excessively when it should not have been.  The consent 
fiction has become an unwitting tool to undermine values 
important to us.  This Section focuses on courts’ enforcement of 
arbitration agreements as an example of how a legal fiction can 
be dangerous.304 
The Supreme Court has frequently announced that the right 
to a jury trial is one of the rights guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution.305  It has described plaintiffs’ right to a jury 
trial as a “fundamental guarantee of the rights and liberties of 
the people.”306  Any attempt to encroach upon this right is to be 
“watched with great jealousy”307 and “scrutinized with the utmost 
care.”308 
A party can voluntarily waive its right to jury trial by 
agreeing to resolve the dispute in an alternative forum such as 
binding arbitration.309  However, to overcome constitutional 
concerns, the key question is whether the claimant voluntarily 
agreed to give up its right to its day in court.310  Despite the  
 
 
303 See id. at 65 (stating that legal fictions remade “legal categories” like 
“possession,” “estate,” and “delivery” to “fit new conditions.”). 
304 This Article focuses only on the courts’ reliance of the consent fiction in 
adjudicating arbitration agreements. The consent doctrine has also been applied in 
ways that undermine other areas of law. For example, some companies sought to 
prevent consumers from posting negative online reviews through contract provisions 
known as “gag orders” or “non-disparagement clauses” within the fine print of the 
purchase contracts or terms of service. A Victory for Free Speech, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-protection 
/building-a-better-world-together-march-2017. The consent fiction allowed the courts 
to enforce the agreements. After courts enforced those agreements, Congress stepped 
in and passed the Consumer Review Fairness Act, which President Obama signed 
into law in December 2016. Id. 
305 Stempel, supra note 183, at 1389–90. 
306 Cory Tischbein, Comment, Animating the Seventh Amendment in 
Contemporary Plaintiffs’ Litigation: The Rule or the Exception?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 233, 233 (2013) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830)). 
307 Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins., 228 U.S. 364, 378 (1913) (quoting Parsons, 28 U.S. 
at 446). 
308 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). 
309 Stempel, supra note 183, at 1391. 
310 Id. at 1392; Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 
544 (2005). 
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constitutional dimension of consent in this context, courts have 
routinely enforced arbitration clauses by indulging in the consent 
fiction.311 
The Supreme Court has always purported to examine the 
validity of arbitration clauses under contract law principles.312  
Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the 
Supreme Court announced, is “a matter of consent, not 
coercion.”313  In practice, the Supreme Court, and federal courts 
following its example, often gave short shrift to the threshold 
question of whether there existed an agreement under contract 
law.314  Their analyses often began with the assumption that 
there was a valid agreement. 
For example, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the 
majority of the Supreme Court held the FAA preempted 
California state case law, which had found class action waivers 
unconscionable.315  The California cases reasoned that such 
waivers so effectively insulated companies from class-based 
claims that they “cheat[ed] large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money . . . .”316  Relying on the “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration,”317 the Supreme Court held 
that the FAA preempts such state laws because they present an 
obstacle to the FAA’s accomplishment and execution.318  The 
majority did not query whether plaintiffs actually consented to 
the arbitration clause printed at the bottom of a one-page, legal-
sized paper with approximately 5/16-inch side margins, 
completely filled with terms printed in small font.319  The only 
 
311 Tischbein, supra note 306, at 248–49; Stempel, supra note 183, at 1392–93 
(finding it “more than a little disturbing that the Court seems unwilling to make a 
sustained examination of consent issues”). 
312 Tischbein, supra note 306, at 252–53; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (noting that courts must treat arbitration agreements like other 
contracts “and enforce them according to their terms”). 
313 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989). 
314 Stempel, supra note 183, at 1430. 
315 AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 352. 
316 Id. at 340 (internal quotations omitted). 
317 Id. at 346. 
318 Id. at 352. 
319 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB) 2008 WL 5216255, at 
*2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d, 584 F.3d 849, rev’d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 333 
(2011). Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion noted that the FAA required 
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate “unless a party successfully asserts a 
defense concerning the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, 
MPP_LEONHARD 12/6/2017  9:00 PM 
2017] DANGEROUS OR BENIGN LEGAL FICTIONS 423 
evidence suggesting an agreement was that the defendant 
provided plaintiffs with a copy of the one-page wireless service 
agreement at the time of purchase.320 
The same apathy is evident in lower federal courts.321  One 
court found an arbitration agreement where there was evidence 
credit card holders received the insert containing amendments to 
a credit card agreement requiring arbitration and enforced the 
arbitration clause on that basis.322 
Many have noted the Supreme Court’s apparent indifference 
or unwillingness to examine the consent issue.323  Arbitration 
clause cases show courts have bought into the consent fiction—
the idea that signature, notice, receipt, purchase, or failure to 
cancel are sufficient evidence of consent.  Because the consent 
fiction has been so often repeated, it has become institutionalized 
as part of the arbitration law jurisprudence.324 
Occasionally, a court will acknowledge consumers might not 
have consented because they did not read the agreement, but 
would nevertheless dismiss the concern by saying that a party’s 
failure to read an agreement is not sufficient to prevent its 
enforcement.325  Courts, however, fail to recognize that the duty-
to-read rule was developed in the late nineteenth century, when 
transactions were primarily face-to-face, parties had the 
opportunity to read prior to signing, and contracts presented 
 
duress, or mutual mistake.” AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Those defenses are all related to a defect during the formation process, 
that is, whether or not the parties consented to the agreement knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
320 Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *9. 
321 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation 
in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795, 799 
(2012) [hereinafter Stempel, Tainted Love]; Stempel, supra note 183, at 1392; 
Tischbein, supra note 306, at 248. 
322 Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917, 926 (N.D. Tex. 
2000); see also Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 12cv418 AJB (NLS), 2012 WL 
1965337, at *1–8 (S.D. Cal. May 31, 2012), rev’d, 771 F.3d 55 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(enforcing the arbitration agreement where the plaintiff failed to cancel his trial 
subscription); Tischbein, supra note 306, at 252–53. 
323 Stempel, Tainted Love, supra note 321, at 799; Stempel, supra note 183, at 
1392; Tischbein, supra note 306, at 248. 
324 See Hope M. Babcock, The Stories We Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal 
Sovereignty: Legal Fictions at Their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV. 803, 819 
(2010) (explaining “[w]hen courts so often repeat legal fictions . . . the factual 
distortions become institutionalized . . .”). 
325 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1997); O’Quin v. 
Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (M.D. La. 2003). 
MPP_LEONHARD 12/6/2017  9:00 PM 
424 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:385   
meaningful choice.326  Courts did not pause to ponder whether the 
justification still applies where consumers have no meaningful 
choice and enforcing the clause is insufficient to motivate the 
consumers to behave differently.327 
As a result of courts’ willingness to enforce arbitration 
agreements, businesses have inserted arbitration clauses, 
including class arbitration waivers, in all transactions affecting 
modern necessities of life such as borrowing money, buying 
consumer goods including cell phones and computers, or entering 
into employment relationships.328  The arbitration clause is often 
among the fine print and not subject to negotiation.329  Courts’ 
reliance on consent fiction has effectively deprived consumers of 
their constitutional right to have their day in court.330 
Excessive judicial reliance on the consent fiction is 
dangerous not only because it results in deprivation of a 
fundamental right, but also because it allows courts to avoid 
having an open debate about the pros and cons of enforcing 
arbitration clauses where consumers have no meaningful choice.  
In our pluralistic society, it is inevitable that different ideals, 
including freedom of contract and right to a jury trial, conflict 
with each other.331  When such conflicts happen, courts should 
 
326 Sullivan, supra note 184, at 268. 
327 See Theodore Eisenberg et. al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 871, 871 (2008). 
328 Tischbein, supra note 306, at 237–38. Elizabeth Dias & Eliana Dockterman, 
The Itsy-Bitsy-Teensy-Weensy, Tiny Fine Print that Can Allow Sexual Harassment 
To Go Unheard, TIME (Oct. 21, 2016), http://time.com/4540111/arbitration-clauses-
sexual-harassment (discussing how arbitration clauses in employment contracts are 
preventing women’s sexual harassment claims from being heard in court); 
CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 304 (pointing out that after the Wells Fargo’s fake-
account scandal, the bank is trying to avoid lawsuits because of the arbitration 
clauses in the agreements with its customers). A study released by Professor Imre S. 
Szalai of Loyola University New Orleans College of Law found that eighty percent of 
the Fortune 100 companies have used arbitration clauses in connection with work 
related disputes. Imre S. Szalai, The Widespread Use of Workplace Arbitration 
Among America’s Top 100 Companies, EMP. RTS. ADVOC. INST. L. & POL’Y 2 (Sept. 
27, 2017), http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/publications/widespread-use-of-
workplace-arbitration/. 
329 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 383, 432–34 (2008) (noting the degree to which modern arbitration is 
often imposed en masse upon consumers or employees rather than being agreed to 
as part of contract negotiations). 
330 Tischbein, supra note 306, at 256–57. 
331 GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 116–17 (1st ed. 1985) (noting that the 
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engage in an open and honest debate about the conflicting ideals.  
The consent fiction allows courts to avoid that debate to the 
detriment of our society.332 
CONCLUSION 
Despite concerns and criticism, legal fictions are analytical 
tools that judges need to resolve complex legal issues.333  They are 
a necessary part of the legal landscape.  Humans’ ability to think 
in abstract terms sets us apart from other animals.  At the same 
time, our very humanity makes some legal fictions dangerous 
unless we are constantly vigilant.  In sum, legal fictions may be 
dangerous not because they are legal fictions, but because of our 
flawed human mind. 
This Article proposes a systematic approach to 
distinguishing benign legal fictions from dangerous ones.  Legal 
fictions can be benign if they come with some built-in reminders 
of their falsity.  The reminder can be linguistic labels.  The 
reminders can also be complete factual falsity or ideological 
inconsistency, both of which create cognitive dissonance that 
alert judges to be deliberate in their approaches rather than to 
rely on intuition.  Such reminders are needed because an 
overreliance on intuitive decision making instead of deliberate 
complex analysis invites severe decision-making biases.  
Conversely, awareness of the falsity of a legal fiction alerts 
judges to engage in complex and deliberate decision making, thus 
overcoming common heuristic decision-making biases and 
improving the overall quality of judicial decision making.334 
Without such reminders, a legal fiction can be dangerous.  
This Article suggests that the consent fiction is a textbook 
example of a dangerous legal fiction, using courts’ enforcement of 
arbitration clauses as an example.  Consent as used in contract 
law does not come with a linguistic label to remind us of its 
falsity.  What is more, this fiction does not rest on complete 
factual falsity; instead, it reduces the evidentiary proof burden 
for judges.  Finally, this fiction allows courts to reach a result 
that is ideologically consistent with the fundamental values that 
 
danger of using legal subterfuges to evade collective responsibility for the value 
being suppressed). 
332 Id. 
333 FULLER, supra note 1, at 52, 94. 
334 Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 25, at 822–23. 
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we share in this society.  Without any built-in reminders, there is 
a high risk that judges will rely on the consent fiction excessively 
and uncritically.  That is exactly what happened with the courts’ 
treatment of arbitration clauses. 
Courts’ excessive and uncritical reliance on the consent 
fiction prevents courts from engaging in an open and honest 
debate about the conflicting ideals implicated in the arbitration 
jurisprudence.335  Had the courts not indulged in the consent 
fiction, they would have had to talk about possible justifications 
for endorsing arbitration where the consumers did not consent to 
the clause.336  Maybe judges can begin by explicitly recognizing 
the reifications of consent as a legal fiction.337  Only then can 
courts begin to engage in a debate to weigh the costs and benefits 
of enforcing agreements where one party has not actually 
consented. 
 
 
335 CALABRESI, supra note 331. 
336 Id. (advocating for honest discussions so that deeply held convictions can 
survive in tension with each other instead of obscuring the conflicts by subterfuges). 
337 Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 2249 (“Many of the concerns can be alleviated 
by openly acknowledging legal fictions as fictions and by evaluating these devices in 
terms of fiction, so that their utility can then be appreciated.”). 
